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1. An employer who pays a relatively low total 
expected compensation does not necessarily signal 
that he does not care about the worker’s welfare. 
(Chapter 2)  
 
 
2. Promotion incentives lead to more efficient 
outcomes than individual incentives when workers 
are reciprocal towards management attention. 
(Chapter 3)  
 
 
3. Sales contests with intermediate performance 
feedback only stimulate workers to exert more effort 
as long as they still have a reasonable chance of 
winning a bonus. (Chapter 4) 
 
 
4. In elimination tournaments, variability in 
performance dilutes incentives to perform.  
(Chapter 5) 
 
 
5. In two-stage elimination tournaments, a more convex 
prize-spread improves performance in the second 
period at the expense of performance in the first 
period. (Chapter 5) 
6. The fact that opinions on whether people can 
generally be trusted widely differ, illustrates that the 
common knowledge assumption is problematic. 
 
7. Altruism, defined as a selfless concern for others, is a 
contradictio in terminis: when an individual cares 
about another’s welfare, he benefits himself by 
helping others. 
 
8. No one disputes that the assumptions of a theoretical 
model should be as intuitive as possible, but the 
same is not true for the results. 
 
9. When we circumscribe “welfare” as “being on the 
right way”, it immediately becomes clear that the 
welfare implications of economic models are not free 
of value judgements. 
 
10. Unfortunately, the effect the researcher has on the 
outcomes of his empirical research cannot be 
corrected for by including a researcher-dummy 
variable in the regressions. 
 
11. Aangezien een verkeersboete zelden boetedoening 
bewerkstelligt, is "verkeersaflaat" een accuratere 
omschrijving voor het financiële offer dat van 
overheidswege van wetsovertreders geëist wordt.  
 
